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EXEUCTIVE SUMMARY
The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reser ve (SPR) is located on the Texas and Louisiana
Gulf Coasts and has ser ved as a national emergency petroleum supply resource since
1975. Contents of this repor t include:
• Information on the historical origins of U.S. national petroleum reser ves dating back
to 1910.
• The U.S.’ increasing grow th as a petroleum consumer and its energy policy interactions
with other countries.
• How the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo forced drastic changes in U.S. energy policy leading to
the SPR’s establishment.
• The SPR’s legal purpose being creating and maintaining a strategic oil reser ve to
mitigate against future oil impor t interruptions or disruptions.
• Managerial and other developments in SPR’s nearly five-decade histor y making
ex tensive use of government information resources.
• Information about SPR facilities and their national petroleum distribution routes.
• Coverage of subsequently established related regional SPR infrastructure including
the Nor theast Home Heating Oil Reser ve and Nor theast Gasoline Oil Supply Reser ve.
• Presidential legal authorit y to make drawdowns and authorize sales from the SPR and
the controversy this has produced during the Biden Administration.
• Academic assessments of SPR and historical and contemporar y congressional critiques
of presidential administration and Energy Depar tment SPR policymaking.
• SPR’s impor tance as a geopolitical asset if petroleum supply disruptions occur in
areas as varied as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca as well as individual countries
including Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.
• Petroleum remaining an impor tant par t of domestic and energy consumption for the
foreseeable future which increases SPR’s impor tance.
• Biden Administration damage to domestic energy production and prices demonstrated
by hostilit y to domestic drilling on land and oceanic waters and unrealistic expectations
about the abilit y of renewable energy resources to meet domestic economic and
national securit y requirements.
• Congressional ef for ts to restrict SPR oil sales to hostile countries such as China.
• The impor tance of the U.S. diesel fuel market to the SPR in terms of impact on consumer
prices and the supply chain.
• Recommendations on enhancing and strengthening SPR’s long-term strength and
viabilit y including increasing SPR’s maximum size, not using SPR for shor t-term political
expediency and directly linking it to af fordable American energy, and enhancing the
scope of supply chain securit y by expanding the Biden Administration’s Februar y 24,
2021 E xecutive Order 14017 to strengthen domestic petroleum industr y resilience.
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INTRODUCTION
The Strategic Petroleum Reser ve (SPR) is located in various areas of Louisiana
and Texas and ser ves as an emergency petroleum supply source. Established in 1975,
national interest in developing a repositor y for this commodit y actually dates back to
the early years of the 20th centur y. This asset has periodically been tapped by the
federal government to respond to real or perceived petroleum supply shor tages caused
by natural disasters such as hurricanes or supply disruptions from overseas petroleum
impor ts. SPR has received renewed at tention during the Biden Administration as
President Biden has tapped into it in an at tempt to address increasing domestic oil
and gas prices occurring during his presidency. This work examines the histor y of the
SPR from the Ford Administration to the present, examines successes and failures it
has experienced, and makes assessments about its future in light of emerging U.S. and
international energy geopolitical trends and developments.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
U.S. interest in developing storage
facilities for petroleum reserves which were
becoming increasingly important to military
and national security planning dates to
the beginning of the 20th century. In 1910,
the U.S. Congress replied to a request from
President William Howard Taft to withdraw
public oil lands from sale and Taft responded
by withdrawing setting aside government
oil reserves in Alaska and California. A Navy
statement on the strategic importance of a
petroleum oil reserve stressed:
The probability of an eventual demand for
petroleum greatly exceeding the supply,
together with the fact that we produce the
greater part of the world’s supply, should
give us a distinct military advantage over
other nations. The control of our exports of oil
might limit the extent of the adoption of the
oil engine by our possible enemies. Under the
present law, however, any foreign nation can
draw on the production of the oil fields of the
United States to an unlimited extent, and can
thus accumulate in time of peace a reserve
supply. 1
This statement would be followed by
the 1912 establishment of naval petroleum
reserves at Elk Hills and Buena Vista
Hills in California in 1912 and by the 1915
establishment of Teapot Dome in Wyoming
with the Navy, Department of the Interior
and congressional naval affairs committees
taking acute interest in this subject and its
national security implications. 2

Controversy over this subject and
corruption potentially inherent in mixing
government

policymaking

and

the

aspirations of the private sector emerged
during the Teapot Dome scandal during the
administration of President Warren Harding
between 1921-1923. Teapot Dome was an
oil reserve located just north of Casper, WY
near Salt Creek in northern Natrona County.
New Mexico Senator Albert Fall (1861-1944),
who had close ties with Harding, became
Secretary of the Interior in 1921. 3
Fall

persuaded

Harding

that

transferring Teapot Dome from the Navy
to the Department of the Interior would
be better public policy for keeping these
reserves safe in the event of an emergency.
Fall proceeded to make secret deals with
prominent oilmen Edward Doheny and Harry
Sinclair to pay bribes to him authorizing
them to drill in these three naval petroleum
reserves in violation of the law. Independent
Wyoming oilman and later Governor Leslie
Miller became suspicious when he saw
trucks with the Sinclair company logo
hauling drilling equipment into Teapot
Dome. Miller asked Wyoming U.S. Senator
John Kendrick (1857-1933) to investigate the
matter which was turned over to a Senate
investigating committee. Harding died in
1923 while traveling in the west, but Fall
would eventually be convicted for accepting
bribes and becoming the first Cabinet-level
official to be imprisoned. 4
Teapot

Dome

demonstrated

the

challenges of finding a workable policy
for oil reserves and the need to balance
American consumers demands for affordable
5
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energy and the petroleum industry’s ability

world’s population in 1970 while consuming

to generally deliver this energy which

about 1/3 of free world oil. In 1973, U.S.

enhanced its political power. Over time,

per capita energy consumption exceeded

naval reserves would become useless

the rest of the world by six times with oil

from drainage from adjacent production

supplying nearly half of U.S. energy needs.

and seemingly incessant litigation. During

This growing demand, declining domestic

World War II Secretary of the Interior Harold

production, and increasing dependence on

Ickes (1874-1952) recognized oil’s strategic

Middle Eastern oil would have a significant

importance for the military and national

political and economic impact on the U.S.

economy and sought to gain access to

The U.S. consumer price index had risen

Middle Eastern reserves during World War II

nearly 6% by 1970 and subsequent public

through the federal government’s Petroleum

displeasure over high prices and energy

Reserve Corporation. These efforts failed

shortages would produce governmental

due to industry hostility, congressional

economic intervention not experienced

suspicion, and public indifference.

since World War II and enormously complex,

5

Between the 1930’s - 1960’s, the
government accepted and used U.S.-

confusing, and controversial governmental
regulatory activity. 7

based multinational oil companies as

A key element in the federal response to

foreign policy leverage to ensure access

these inflationary pressures was President

to foreign oil.

Richard Nixon announcing across-the-board

Eisenhower

Presidents Truman and

understood

the

national

wage and price controls in a nationally

economic and security implications of

televised August 15, 1971 speech.

oil and explored creating government-

controls included oil and natural gas prices.

owned oil reserves or stockpiles. However,

Despite these controls being lifted by 1974,

economic prosperity, public opposition to

continuing public displeasure with energy

increasing governmental regulation and the

shortages and price increases meant some

market oriented nature of the U.S.’ political

crude oil price controls would continue

economy industry produced opposition

until 1981. These controls had the negative

to efforts to create a government-owned

impacts of reducing domestic oil production

reserve system. This oil industry opposition

incentives, encouraging consumption, and

included functional segments within this

furthering U.S. demand for and dependence

industry such as marketing, producing,

on foreign oil.

refining, and transporting.

6

ended pro-rationing (proportionally limiting

Significant changes in American

production or distribution of oil or natural

production

consumption

gas) in 1971-1972 and the government

occurred during the 1960’s and early 1970’s.

abandoned import restrictions in 1973. This

The U.S. had become the world’s largest oil

facilitated oil imports rising from 2.2 million

consumer exemplified by containing 5% of the

barrels per day in 1967 to 6.2 million barrels

energy

and

These

U.S. oil producing states

6
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per day in 1973 and imported oil increasing

including gas reducing measures such as

from 19-36% over this time period until it

car pooling, speed limits, and rationing. It

accounted for 48% of total U.S. petroleum

also supported power utilities switching

consumption by 1977. 8

from petroleum to coal-based energy

These adverse trends reached the

sources, limiting maximum production

White House which began exploring the

requirements, and opening reserves such

possibility of strategic oil stockpiling.

as Elk Hills, CA for increased development.

Writing in the influential journal Foreign

It went on to note that an oil stockpiles

Affairs in 1973, James Akins, the head of

equaling or exceeding 500 million barrels

the State Department’s Office of Fuels and

would protect against a daily sic million

Energy who had been Nixon’s energy advisor,

barrel per day shortfall lasting ninety days.

noted that Arab countries had threatened

It also recommended underground salt-

on fifteen separate occasions to use oil as a

dome cavers as providing the most-secure

weapon against their enemies which he felt

and least expensive storage possibilities for

was exacerbated by U.S. support for Israel.

a large-scale reserve program.10

In late 1972, Akins recommended drastic

A final NPC report on this subject was

conservation measures, exploring energy

issued in September 1974. It maintained

alternatives, increasing cooperation among

that only free market policies would bring

oil-consuming countries, and measures

about energy self-sufficiency but also noted

to build up reserve stocks and ultimately

that the existing political climate would not

advocated for establishing a publicly owned

permit lifting price controls and allocations

stockpile which he believed was necessary

in favor of a free market. NPC proceeded to

for strategic purposes.

examine options for an emergency petroleum

9

This subject became increasingly

reserve system and looked at shut-in or in-

concerning to the Nixon Administration

situ reserves, man-made crude oil storage,

and in January 1973, Interior Secretary

and man-made refined product refined

Rogers Morton stressed concern about the

storage. Storage media examined by the

U.S.’ increasing economic vulnerability and

council included steel tanks, underground

called upon the National Petroleum Council

salt-dome caverns, and hard rock mines.

(NPC) (a federally charted and privately

The report concluded that protecting

funded advisory committee) too analyze

against an import interruption of 3 million

the impact of a 1.5 million barrel per day

barrels per day lasting 180 days would

supply disruption lasting three months and

require the U.S. establishing an oil reserve

a 3 million barrel per day disruption lasting

system containing either 540 million barrels

six months. A July 1973 NPC interim report

of crude oil or refined petroleum products.

looked at potential disruptions occurring

This document ultimately recommended

in January 1974 and January 1978 and

developing underground caverns along the

recommended curtailing consumption and

Texas and Louisiana Gulf coasts which could
7
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provide 500 million barrels of storage and

problems; long consumer gas lines; and

would offer the safest and cheapest form

disputes with Americans competing against

of storage. This geographic region was

each other for access to decreasing energy

recommended for abundant salt domes; a

resources.12

large refining and pipeline transportation

This event saw the U.S. consider

complex, and first class seaports which had

numerous possible responses to this event

extensive petroleum commerce experience.

including the possibility of imposing a food

Finally, NPC noted that filling this reserve

embargo on Arab countries and militarily

would require purchasing from foreign

seizing oil supplies from these countries.

suppliers with then existing U.S. oil reserves

It ultimately would place a harsh spotlight

on Alaska’s North Slope, and California’s Elk

on the U.S.’ vulnerability to energy supply

hills Naval Petroleum Reserve and Santa

disruption,

Barbara at maximum production rates.

on volatile foreign energy supplies, and

11

for

developing

excessive

dependence

the need to begin developing means of

ARAB OIL EMBARGO
Impetus

it’s

achieving greater energy supply autonomy.13
a

U.S.

This was a volatile and transitional

petroleum storage facility was accelerated

time period in U.S. political history due to

during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War

the Watergate scandal, the presidential

between Israel and adjacent Arab countries.

transition from Nixon to Gerald Ford, and to

The Soviet Union militarily supported the

developments in U.S. energy policymaking.

Arabian countries while the U.S. provided

The primary federal energy policymaking

extensive military support to Israel. On

agency at this time was the Federal Energy

October 16, 1973, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Qatar,

Administration (FEA). In November 1974, FEA

Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates

produced a two part Project Independence

raised oil prices 70% from $2.90-$5.11 per

Report which concluded that reducing

barrel with these Organization of Petroleum

U.S. vulnerability to oil supply disruption

Exporting Countries (OPEC) accounting for

was more realistic than achieving energy

nearly 54% of world crude oil production.

independence.

These countries raised their prices to $11.65

recommended that options to reduce

per barrel in December 1973 representing a

supply vulnerability involved accelerating

quadrupling of these prices since October.

domestic production, augmenting energy

These price increases had extensive impacts

conservation and demand management,

in the U.S. and internationally with U.S.

and strategic oil stockpiling.

aviation fuel shortages resulting in airlines

Project

Independence

This assessment did not provide

reducing their flights by 25%; independent

specific

trucking companies blocking highways and

commented that strategic stockpiling would

demanding federal government assistance;

be cheaper than most energy security

creating

options. It examined a scenario where the

some

car

dealer

inventory

policy

recommendations

but

8
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U.S. faced a year-long disruption of one
million barrels per day and concluded that

The creation and maintenance of strategic

a 500 million barrel reserve should be the

reserves-with oil and other energy forms

target goal with possible future expansion

priced at historic highs-will not be cheap.

to one billion barrels. Project Independence

The question must be asked, however, can we

calculated that the cost of developing a

afford not to stockpile such reserves? 15

500-million barrel reserve would be $6.3
billion as opposed to the estimated $30-

This legislation required creating

$40 billion Gross Domestic Product loss

and maintaining a strategic oil reserve

which would occur from a supply disruption.

to mitigate against future oil import

This report concluded by saying that

interruptions or reductions.

government-owned salt dome storage would

authorized creation of regional petroleum

be more financially advantageous than other

reserves for areas and regions like New

underground storage alternatives including

England with high dependence on imports

mined caverns, salt beds, abandoned

for fuel oil requirements and authorized

mines, and depleted reservoirs with the

the FEA administrator to obtain crude oil

rock salt characterizing these domes being

from federal lands such as Naval Petroleum

impervious to liquid petroleum and gas.14

Reserves to build this reserve.16

Congress

and

The Senate Interior and Insular Affairs

strategic

Committee printed this report on June 26,

On February

1975. It noted that three possible benefits

12, 1975, Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA),

could be derived from a strategic oil

a prominent figure in energy and national

reserves system including:

preparing

began

legislation

exploring

It also

on

petroleum reserve in 1975.

a

security policymaking, introduced S. 677 the
Strategic Energy Reserves Act of 1975. This

•

Alleviating energy resources and related

legislation reflected the pro-government

inflation by mitigating the adverse

ownership of such a facility characterized

impacts of future disruptions.

by a heavily Democratic congress. During

•

his speech introducing this legislation
Jackson stressed:

Establishing such a reserve might deter a
future oil embargo.

•

Near-term energy security provided by
a strategic reserve system would be an

The concept of strategic energy re-serves is

intermediate step toward a longer-term

simple. The stockpiling of energy supplies

aspiration of energy self-sufficiency.17

provides some degree of protection against
unexpected interruptions or reductions of

Further congressional debate occurred

energy imports. And the very existence of

on this during the 1975 with both the

adequate re-serves can serve as a deterrent

Senate and House passing versions whose

to such interruptions or reductions.

provisions also included extending price
9
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controls, increasing presidential powers to

Colorado and Utah from the Navy to DOE. 20

impose gasoline rationing and allocation

Final years of the Ford Administration and

and

conservation

early years of the Carter Administration

efficiency

saw FEA and DOE explore possible locations

standards for automobiles and electrical

and procedures for the SPR. An October

appliances; extending FEA’s power to use

1979 communication from DOE to Congress

coal instead of natural gas; and allowing the

spelled out SPR’s distribution plan. It noted

reserve’s size to be up to one million barrles

that the 1975 Energy Policy & Control Act

of crude oil and petroleum products. The

permitted presidentially authorized SPR

legislation was signed later that month by

drawdowns and distributions if required

President Ford.

by “a severe energy supply disruption or

prescribing

measures;

energy

requiring

fuel

18

by U.S. obligations under the International

SPR EARLY YEARS
Developing

government

Program.” 21
agencies

like SPR is a time-consuming process. The

This statute defined a severe energy
disruption as:

Texas-Louisiana Gulf Coast was a natural
choice due to it having an existing large

(A) is, or is likely to be, of significant scope

seaport and marine terminal complex and

and duration, and of an emergency

being home to the U.S.’ largest refining

nature;

and transportation network. Over 50% of

(B) may cause major adverse impact on

imported crude oil entering the U.S. did

national safety or the national economy;

so through adjacent ports, refineries, and

and;

pipelines and this region also possessed the

(C) results, or is likely to result, from an

largest number and highest concentration of

interruption in the supply of imported

acceptable salt-dome formations. FEA also

petroleum products, or from sabotage or

determined, in consultation with petroleum

an act of God. 22

industry representatives, that the best mix
of SPR petroleum reserves would be 60%
intermediate high density/high sulfur (sour)
crude oil and 40% low density/low sulfur
(sweet) crude oil.19
A key early development in SPR was
the 1977 establishment of a cabinet-level
Department of Energy (DOE) which would
take responsibility for administering SPR.
This statute transferred existing naval
petroleum reserves in Kern County, CA and
Teapot Dome, WY, and oil shale reserves in

This report noted that as of September
30, 1979, 89.6 million barrels (mmb) of crude
oil were stored at 3 SPR sites with the
following breakdowns by type of oil:

•

West Hackberry, LA 2.9 mmb sweet and 26.6
mmb sour;

•
•
•

Bayou Choctaw, LA 28.2 mmb sweet;
Bryan Mound, TX 31.9 mmb sweet.
Site withdrawal distribution capability from
these sites was 1 mmb. 23
10
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Additional characteristics of this document included requirements for eligible crude
oil refiners qualified to purchase oil from SPR include submitting priced offers for SPR oil
announced for sale by DOE based on the highest prices offered and the refiners ability have
the oil delivered on acceptable schedules; oil delivery to these refiners would occur under
the current DOE Buy/Sell program, Standby Mandatory Crude Oil Regulations, and new DOE
proposed regulations; and apportioning buying rights among all eligible refiners. Prices for
SPR crude oil sold on a non-competitive basis would be administratively set at approximately
the averaged landed import oil price unless a lower of higher price is determined to be in
the national interest. 24
Drawdown rates were intended to increase with the amount of oil in storage. Upon reaching
538 million barrels, drawdown rates would be 3.5 million barrels per day and upon reaching 1 billion
barrels, SPR’s drawdown rate would be 4-5 million barrels per day. This drawdown would be achieved
by injecting large quantities of freshwater beneath the oil, displacing the oil from its salt cavern, then out
into DOE’s transportation pipelines, then to the Texoma, Capline, and Seaway pipelines, and from there
to various regional refining markets. Concern over the environmental impacts of SPR, including potential
tanker spills in the Gulf of Mexico, was also incorporated into early SPR program planning. 25
FIGURE 1 CURRENT SPR STORAGE AND SITE LOCATIONS 26

SPR’s physical infrastructure began

acres, had access to the Gulf of Mexico’s

expanding in 1982-1983, when DOE began

Intracoastal Waterway, and was accessible

the process of acquiring the Big Hill site

to nearby oil refining and transportation

in Jefferson County, TX from Amoco and

centers in Beaumont and Houston.

individual landowners. This site had 271

Hill began operations in 1986 and would

Big

11
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eventually have fourteen caverns with a 160 billion barrel storage capacity and facilitated
DOE efforts to move SPR toward a 750 million barrel total storage capacity. 27
FIGURES 2A, 2B, & 2C: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DISTRIBUTION CAPABILITIES (2020) 28

12
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As of 2020, SPR’s current capacity was limited to 713.5 million barrels with the then current
inventory at 635 million barrels. The 1975 Energy Policy Control Act required authorized SPR
to have at least 150 million barrels of petroleum and up to 1 billion barrels. In 1978, Congress
authorized expanding SPR’s physical capacity to 750 million barrels and in 2005 directed
further expansion to 1 billion barrels. The emergence of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal
drilling techniques by 2010 led the Obama Administration to cancel SPR expansion plans on
the rationale that U.S. petroleum consumption and import dependence would decline in the
future and that SPR’s projected capacity would increase to 90 days by 2025. 29
FIGURE 3: AERIAL VIEW OF SPR STORAGE SITES 30

ADDITIONAL REGIONAL SPR RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE
During July 2000, President Clinton

events or recognizing that increasing prices

directed DOE to establish a 2 mmbbl reserve

indicate more supply was need. NEHHOR was

in the Northeast (Northeast Home Heating

created to hold roughly 10 days inventory

Oil Reserve)(NEHHOR)which would supply

which is the time required for ships carrying

consumers with supplemental home heating

additional heating oil from the Gulf of Mexico

oil resources if supply shortages resulted

to New York Harbor.

from severe winter weather. This measure

this order into law in November 2000 and

sought to allow commercial companies

NEHHOR’s capacity is one million barrels of

to compensate for severe winter weather

ultra low sulfur distillate. 31

Congress enacted

supply interruptions without dissuading

Superstorm Sandy’s 2012 landfall in the

these companies from maintaining sufficient

northeastern U.S. caused heavy damage to

stock levels to respond to routine weather

two New York Harbor area refineries closing
13
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more than 40 terminals in this harbor. Consequently, some New York gas stations did not
have fuel for nearly 30 days. This resulted in DOE establishing the one million barrel per day
Northeast Gasoline Oil Supply Reserve (NGSR) in 2014. Its purpose is supplying Northeast
consumers with supplemental gasoline supplies for a limited time if a natural disaster or
other supply disruption occurs until existing supply channels can resume operation. 700,000
barrels of this reserve are located near the New York Harbor, 200,000 barrels in the Boston
area, and 100,000 barrels in South Portland, ME. However, it should be noted that gasoline
cannot be stored as long as crude oil. Gasoline blended with 10% ethanol may have a
three month shelf life storage while crude oil can be stored with minimal deterioration for
periods exceeding five years. Consequently, gasoline’s short shell life requires active supply
management by NGSR. 32
FIGURE 4 NEHHOR AND NGSR STORAGE LOCATIONS 33

SPR DRAWDOWN CAPACITY
The President is legally authorized to make

a presidential authorization due to processing

drawdowns from the SPR and petroleum sales

sales and preparing to distribute assets. The

can be made under federal law. SPR’s maximum

1991 Persian Gulf War was the first authorized

drawdown rate is 4.4 million barrels per day for

drawdown global peak lost production of 4.3

90 days (396 million barrels over this time period)

million barrels per day due to the absence of Iraqi

due to capacity constraints in the pipelines

and Kuwaiti crude oil. Presidential discretion is

and marine terminals service SPR. After this

also required to refill the SPR after a drawdown.

time period, drawdown rates begin declining

This can be done when crude oil prices decline or

as caverns deplete. It takes approximately 13

favorable political and market conditions making

days for the crude oil to enter the market from

it such purchases economically advantageous.
14
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The International Energy Agency (IEA) also requires its members to hold a 90-day supply equivalent to
net imports and Congress can authorize SPR infrastructure expansion to increase maximum drawdown
rate.34
When an SPR drawdown is authorized DOE releases this oil by conducting a public sale to the
highest bidder in a competitive auction. A “notice of sale” includes the volume, characteristics, and the
location of the petroleum for sale; delivery dates and procedures for submitting offers; and measures for
assuring performance and financial responsibility. DOE reviews the bids and awards are offered and it
also estimates oil enters the market approximately two weeks after publication of the “notice for sale.” An
example of a test sale occurred during 2014 when DOE wanted to know if recent infrastructure changes
could impact SPR drawdown capabilities and exercise sales procedures. The test was successful and
DOE learned lessons about some pipeline and storage capacity limitations.35
No releases from the SPR were made until 1985 and this chart lists releases by test sales, emergency,
exchange, and other factors from 1985-2019.
FIGURE 5 SPR RELEASES BY TYPE THROUGH 2019 36

PARTIAL GOVERNMENT SALES OF
PETROLEUM RESERVES
Some

naval

petroleum

reserves

Subsequently two naval oil shale reserves

In 1996, Congress

in Colorado were transferred to the Interior

determined California’s Elk Hills properties

Department’s Bureau of Land Management

no longer served national defense purposes

for commercial mineral leasing including

and authorized steps toward potential

natural gas production and future petroleum

divestment or privatization. This resulted in

exploration.

an October 5, 1998 sale of these properties

an undeveloped naval oil shale reserve in

to Occidental Petroleum for $3.65 billion.

Utah to Northern Ute Indians in the largest

have been privatized.

In 2000-2001, DOE returned

15
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transfer of federal property to American
Indians in the last century.

The 2005

Energy Policy Act allowed transfer of naval
petroleum reserve property to the Interior
Department with some these lands being
transferred to local governments in Taft
and Ford City, CA. Wyoming’s Teapot Dome
was sold in 2015 to Stranded Oil Resources
Corporation for over $45 million. 37

weaknesses,

and

strengths,

effectiveness

during

its nearly five decade existence.

It has

been described as being necessary for
maintaining a U.S. petroleum reserve and
an unnecessary example of governmental
bureaucracy which could be better handled
by the private sector.

Other critiques

have seen SPR as part of an unattainable
effort to achieve energy independence,
contended that unanticipated SPR releases
have had no measureable impact oil prices
while unanticipated SPR purchases raise
oil prices by 1%; that release from SPR
have been motivated primarily by political
instead of economic or strategic reasons,
and that the U.S. should strive to fill the SPR
and consider developing the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge and adding it as an adjunct
to SPR. 38

literature for over four decades.

A 1981

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report
noted that if SPR did not exist, there would

Product by approximately $146 billion,

assessments of SPR reaching various
its

of congressional and other governmental

per day in 1984, reducing Gross Domestic

There have been multiple academic
about

Analyses of the SPR have been part

be an annual shortfall of 2 million barrels

SELECTED ACADEMIC SPR
ASSESSMENTS

conclusions

CONGRESSIONAL AND
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL SPR
ASSESSMENTS

increase the unemployment rate 1.1%, and
increase the inflation rate 7%. This analysis
also noted that only 250 million barrels of
one billion barrels authorized by Congress
had been completed with 150 million more
barrels slated for completion by 1985.
Achieving the Reagan Administration’s
plans to fill the reserve at 200,000 barrels
for fiscal year 1981 and 230,000 barrels for
fiscal year 1982 would create a 250 million
barrel reserve by the end of 1982 and
subsequently require filling the reserve and
195,000 barrels per day for the next seven
years to achieve a 750 billion barrel reserve
by the end of 1989.

This would require

additional budget authority to purchase this
oil of $36.7 billion until 1989. 39
A 1994 General Accountability Office
(now General Accounting Office) (GAO)
report on SPR examined various problems
affecting SPR readiness. GAO noted that
the buildup of geothermal heat and gas in
stored crude oil and replacing equipment
at the end of its design life would correct
or prevent significant degradation in SPR’s
ability to respond to oil disruptions. GAO
16
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ranked making such corrections as high

U.S. oil supplies with crude oil inventories

priorities contending failing to make these

dropping 10% from 310-280 million barrels

enhancements would make it more costly

in 2002. 41

for SPR to expand its capacity to 750 million
barrels or even one billion barrels. This

This

committee’s

minority

staff

recommended that:

report also noted that elevated temperatures
and high gas content reduce DOE’s ability to

•

SPR defer all 2003 deliveries until

draw down the oil due to increased vapor

near term crude oil prices fall and U.S.

pressure of the oil stemming from safety

commercial inventories increase. It also

and air pollution limits. 40

recommended DOE announce this policy

A 2003 report by the Minority Staff

change to calm markets making it clear

of the Senate Committee on Governmental

it will not further reduce commercial oil

Affairs, as part of a long-term investigation

supplies under existing market conditions.

into retail U.S. gasoline prices, heard DOE

•

Conduct a cost-benefit analysis to fill SPR

attempts to fill SPR were causing crude oil

without regard to oil prices and deferrals

prices to rise significantly. These staffers

while DOE should also analyze whether

met with personnel from DOE, SPR, the

U.S. energy security is best measured by

Commodity Futures Trading Commission,

considering only the amount of oil under

and Britain’s Financial Services Authority,

government control or also the amount of

and individuals from futures exchanges in

oil in U.S. commercial inventories.

Chicago, London, New York, and Atlanta,

•

DOE

should

restore

SPR

business

along with a wide variety of oil industry

procedures allowing oil delivery deferrals

experts, and price and trading data from U.S.

when crude oil prices are high and

and British oil markets. Report conclusions

commercial supplies are tight and if the

were:

contractor agrees to deliver extra oil to
the SPR at a later time.

•

•

In 2002 DOE began filling SPR without

The

Commodity

and

Trading

Commission

when prices were relatively low.

Mercantile Exchange should work together

Filling the SPR in a tight market increased

to reduce price volatility stemming from

U.S. oil prices and injured U.S. consumers

supply and demand imbalances in the

increasing the U.S. home heating oil spot

U.S. West Texas Intermediate market.

•

(CFTC)

Futures

regard to oil price instead of filling SPR

price by 13%, jet fuel by 10%, and diesel

•

•

New

York

Congress should increase CFTC traders

fuel by 8% and increasing costs to U.S.

in over the counter markets to provide

consumers between $500 million and $1

it with routine information on large

billion.

positions in crude oil and energy

This high cost did not result in filling the

contracts and derivatives to facilitate

SPR did not result in increasing overall

its ability to detect, prevent, and halt
17
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In

of Mexico to dispose of the brine produced

addition CFTC should also strengthen

during storing cavern creation, would cause

its efforts with international counterpart

environmental damage stemming from

agencies to detect, prevent, and halt

pipeline leaks. 43

commodity market manipulation.

DOE’s Sandia National Laboratory

global commodity market manipulation. 42

and Mississippi State agencies reached
A June 2007 DOE Inspector General (IG)

different conclusions about the Bruinsburg

report explored possible SPR expansion as

site.

part of 2005 Energy Policy Act requirement

recommended to DOE that the wells be

to increase the reserves maximum storage

located at Bruinsburg.

capacity to one billion barrels of crude oil.

Mississippi Office of Geology believed

Following initial exploration of options, DOE

problems remained with Bruinsburg area

decided to develop an initial 160 million

well locations. Sandia ultimately concluded

barrel storage facility at Richton, MS and

that Bruinsburg could only hold 70 million

expand storage capacity at two preexisting

barrels of oil which was insufficient to

reserve facilities. This evaluation process

meet SPR storage capacity requirement.

saw DOE eliminate a salt dome in Bruinsburg,

Consequently, another SPR facility at this

MS as a possible expansion site.

location as not been implemented. 44

DOE’s

In February and June 2006 Sandia
However, the

rationale for eliminating the Bruinsburg

A May 2012 Congressional Budget Office

salt dome was the site being too small to

review noted significant quantities of global

meet storage needs and posing significant

oil were produced in countries vulnerable to

technical risks since DOE would need to use

civil, military, and geopolitical developments

deep injection wells to dispose nearly 1.2

with few countries besides Saudi Arabia

million barrels per day of brine to excavate

possessing much spare capacity to offset

the caverns.

oil disruptions. In contrast, U.S. producers

This

process,

however,

produced

and consumers, as of 2010, had significant

public and congressional concern about

natural gas and coal storage reserves.

the procedures for eliminating Bruinsburg.

Additionally, the U.S. could benefit from

A congressional member determined DOE

selective releases of petroleum reserves

failed to use existing well data, not resolved

from the SPR IF those releases were not

questions about data reliability concerning

implemented in coordination with other oil

well location, nor used existing seismic data.

producing countries. 45

Four private sector geologists contended

This assessment also noted that

that Bruinsburg dome could meet DOE

releasing SPR had not been used most supply

storage requirements for 160 million barrels

disruptions occurring in the past and that

of oil. In addition, the member of Congress,

using SPR held two disadvantages including

that the planned approach to the Richton

being offset if other oil producing countries

site, using a 100 mile long pipeline to the Gulf

reduced their output and the U.S. ability to
18
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lower world oil prices for an extended period

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 and Section

would be small.

32204 of the FAST Act mandating SPR

For instance, as Saudi

Arabia and other oil producing countries can
increase production to offset disruptions,

drawdowns.

•

SPR’s

continually

shrinking

storage

they can also reduce production to offset

will be able to accommodate inventory

additional supply to the market such as SPR

levels mandated and authorized by

releases. Saudi Arabia and OPEC countries

the Bipartisan Budget and FAST Acts,

have stressed their desire to maintain stable

but significant inventory additions will

world oil prices and to offset additional

require developing new storage.

supply to achieve that objective. The IEA

•

also calculates that SPR maintains half of
oil reserves possessed by oil importing

Operational requirements dictate SPR
maintain its current four site configuration.

•

Amending limited, discrete sections of the

countries and available for emergency use

Energy Policy and Conservation Act will

and that an SPR release would have little

result in improvements and efficiencies

impact on global oil prices.

to managing and operating authorities

46

A more detailed assessment of SPR

governing SPR and NEHHOR. 47

was provided by a 2016 congressionally
mandated report from DOE. Key findings of
this assessment were:

SPR sales and releases between
1985-March

2014

include

test

sales

authorized by the Energy Policy Control Act

•

•

•

SPR’s aging infrastructure will began

for Operations Desert Shield and Desert

fundamentally

reserve

Storm in 1990-1991; reducing the budget

capabilities. Investing in a second Life

deficit according to 1996’s budget deficit

Extension project is essential for ensuring

appropriations acts; exchanging oil with

long-term integrity of SPR assets and its

Citgo and Conoco for the blockage of a

ability to carry out its mission.

ship channel providing access to incoming

Expanding North American oil production

crude oil shipments to those refineries,

and resulting shifts in U.S. midstream

exchanging 98 million barrels of oil with

infrastructure have reduced SPR’s ability

Shell Pipeline to secure storage tanks in

to add incremental barrels of oil to the

advance of Hurricane Lili during October

market if an oil supply crisis occurs.

2002; approving six requests for emergency

Adding dedicated marine terminals will

crude oil loans to address shortages caused

significant enhance effective Reserve

by Hurricane Katrina’s impending 2005

distribution capacity.

disruption of oil production and distribution;

SPR is projected to provide substantial

a 2006 exchange of 767 million barrels of oil

national economic benefits over the

in Texas’ Sabine Neches Ship Channel due to

following

those

a barge accident in this channel; President

mandated by Sections 403-404 of the

Obama’s Authorization of the need to offer

25

compromising

years

beyond
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30 million barrels of sweet crude oil to offset an interruption in Libyan supplies due to war
in that country. 48
FIGURE 6 EXAMPLES OF STRUCTURAL FAILURES AT SPR FACILITIES IN 2015 AND 2016 49

A 2018 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report was asked by Congress

and that DOE could not be assured SPR will
be properly sized in the future. 50

to examine the extent to which DOE had

This document went on to note

identified the SPR’s optimal size and its plans

that DOE has taken steps to account for

for modernizing SPR to consider the effects

congressionally mandated sales into its

of congressionally mandated crude oil sales.

$1.4 billion infrastructure and facilities

This assessment noted that DOE had failed

modernization plan, but that its information

to fully consider recent and expected future

is based on information prior to recently

changes in market conditions including the

mandated sales and that SPR is projected

implications of falling net imports or the

to hold 405 million barrels of oil at the end

roles of increased private reserves may

of fiscal year 2027. GAO also noted that DOE

play in responding to supply disruptions. At

does not plan to examine the potential for

this time, such changes contributed to SPR

leasing unused SPR storage capacity to

and private reserves reaching historically

the private sector since it is not currently

high levels on a net imports basis.

authorized to enter into such leases.

In

If

addition, such changes were to expect to

authorized, leasing revenue could help

continually evolve with the U.S. becoming

generate revenues offsetting modernization

a net exporter in the late 2020s before

costs and that DOE is missing beneficial

becoming a net importer between 2040 and

ways to modernize SPR while saving

2050. GAO contended that there should be

taxpayer resources. 51

an examination of SPR if conditions change
20
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FIGURE 7 U.S. HOLDINGS IN THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE AND PRIVATE RESERVES, 1977-2017 52

Determinations reached by GAO in its 2018 SPR analysis noted that DOE has failed to
identify the optimal SPR size of the potential need for regional product reserves; its analysis
has been limited by not fully evaluate implications of market fluctuations and estimating IEA
obligations of holding the equivalent of 90 days of net imports; not considering private sector
responses in the event of supply disruptions; not fully examining the costs and benefits
of different size reserves; not identifying whether additional regional petroleum product
reserves should be part of SPR; DOE still has uncertainty about SPR’s long-term size, and
uncertainty hampering DOE efforts to account for future mandated sales. 53
FIGURE 8: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE LOCATIONS AND REGIONAL PETROLEUM PRODUCT SUPPLY VULNERABILITIES IDENTIFIED BY DOE IN
2014. 54
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GAO’s four recommendations to DOE
included:

expensive solutions for responding to
regional fuel supply disruptions. 56
Congressional SPR oversight also

•

•

•

•

agency’s

takes the form of periodically scheduled

2016 long-term strategic review by

committee hearings. A July 2, 2018 House

incorporating an additional analysis

Energy & Commerce Committee hearing

accounting for private sector response,

discussed legislation to commercialize

oil market projections, and costs and

the SPR. Energy Subcommittee chair Rep.

benefits of various different SPR sizes.

Fred Upton (R-MI) stressed that the U.S.

DOE taking actions to periodically

was, arguably, more energy secure than

inform Congress of an SPR strategic

ever ranking as the world’s top oil and gas

review accounting for changes in crude

producer and that imports had declined

oil and petroleum market conditions

about 70% since peaking in 2005. He also

and incorporating additional analysis,

noted surging domestic production, private

including the costs and benefits of

crude oil stocks being at record levels,

multiple SPR sizes.

pipelines being full, and refineries operating

DOE conducting studies on the costs and

at near peak capacity.

benefits of regional petroleum produce

legislation, Rep. Bobby Rush (D-IL) observed

reserves for all U.S. regions identified as

that the committee should examine if there

vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions with

was still a need for SPR and whether the

these results reported to Congress.

SPR should be leased to the private sector

DOE considering a full range of options

of foreign government not posing a national

for handling potentially excess assets and

security risk to maximize taxpayers return

requesting congressional authority to dispose

on investment. 57

DOE

supplementing

the

Supporting this

Committee Chair Rep. Greg Walden (R-

these assets.55

OR) noted that SPR remained important for
In

its

response

to

GAO’s

energy security, meeting treaty obligations

recommendations, DOE partially agreed with

to

international

partners

if

supply

the first recommendation while emphasizing

disruptions occur, and keep adversaries

that optimal SPR size could range from 430-

from using oil as an economic weapon.

695 million barrels of oil and that an optimal

He also stressed that SPR reserves

SPR size threshold should meet IEA’s 90 days

require considerable upgrades to enhance

import and collective action obligations.

responsiveness when called upon, that

DOE agreed with the second and fourth

these stockpiles may further degraded

GAO recommendations, but disagreed with

as stocks decline, and that a successful

the third recommendation maintaining that

leasing program would attract investment

government owned and operated regional

enhancing facility operations, be more

petroleum reserves were inefficient and

responsive to facility emergency use needs,
22
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and preserve the existing capacity of the resources caverns. 58
One witness at this hearing was Daniel Evans of Flour Federal Petroleum Operations
which has been the SPR Maintenance and Operations contractor since 2004. He noted
that congressionally mandated sales have significantly changed SPR operations with
SPR sites maintaining a 4.4 million barrel per day draw down and readiness posture
to maintaining draw down readiness while also conducting intermediate variable rate
deliveries from the reserves. Evans also noted that during Hurricane Harvey was able
to deliver about 5 million barrels per day to refineries in need. He also noted that
cycling fluids in and out of leased caverns under proposed legislation would co-mingle
government and commercial assets requiring additional capital investments and
supported Congress making such investments. 59
SPR’s 2018 Annual Report provided details on recent program developments.
These included beginning calendar year 2018 with 662.8 million barrels of crude oil
and ending that calendar year with 649.1 million barrels of crude oil representing a
decline of 13.7 million barrels equivalent to approximately 113 days of net U.S. crude
oil imports. Crude oil sales deposited $347,828,624 dollars of revenue into the Energy
Security Infrastructure Modernization Fund to enhance SPR modernization funding and
$745,704,184 was deposited into the General Fund of the Treasury.60
The following chart documents SPR’s authorized storage and drawdown capacity
as of December 31, 2018
FIGURE 9 AUTHORIZED STORAGE AND DRAWDOWN CAPACITY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2018 61

Enhancements to cavern storage integrity included completing 11 well workovers,
repairing brine disposal wells, and remediation of one cavern well.

A second rig was

leased to augment a DOE-owned rig to accelerate well repairs and increase inventory
availability and another cavern well was repaired by injecting polymer sealant saving DOE
over $2 million compared to a conventional rig-based remediation. The Bayou Choctaw site
was purged of brine disposal wells of accumulated sand and mineral scale under budget
and ahead of schedule to prepare for receiving oil exchanged with refiners in response to
Hurricane Harvey. Plans to drill 17 new cavern wells and two new brine disposal wells were
also initiated. 62
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FIGURE 10 CRUDE OIL INVENTORY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2018 63

An October 17, 2019 Senate Energy

Yemen, and Egypt are threatened. 64

and Natural Resources Committee hearing

Administrator Linda Capuano of the

examined SPR matters. Committee Chair

DOE’s Energy Information Administration

Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) began by

(EIA) noted the September 14, 2019 attack

noting the 2015 release of a Committee

on a Saudi Arabian processing facility

majority staff paper describing SPR as an

and oil field which disrupted 7 million

“essential resource” emphasizing that SPR

barrels per day of crude oil production

is virtually unique among IEA members

representing 5% of global crude oil and

in

stockpile

liquid fuels production capacity. She also

government

noted that this attack caused the Brent

controlled reserves, the SPR being a key

crude oil price to increase more than $7 per

national security asset if geopolitical supply

barrel and West Texas Intermediate crude

disruptions occur in venues as varied as

oil price to increase more than $8 per barrel

Iraq, Venezuela, and Algeria, SPR reserves

to $68.42 and $63.10 respectively. Capuano

can be called on if global oil chokepoints

then noted that inventories such as SPR

such as the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz,

can cushion supply disruptions with then

fulfilling

requirements

its

emergency
through
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current EIA data noting that September

oil sector in the 2040’s would be 67 million

27,

inventories

barrels per day which is comparable to the

represented 26 days of current U.S. refinery

early 1990’s and assessed that drawing

crude oil inputs and SPR crude oil inputs

down U.S. SPR levels would challenge the

holding an additional 40 days, giving the

future effectiveness of IEA stock systems

U.S. 66 total inventory days. 65

while encouraging the U.S. to maintain

2019

U.S.

commercial

DOE Assistant Secretary for Fossil
Energy

Steven

Winberg

noted

SPR’s

robust SPR volumes to uphold global energy
security. 67

miossion involved protecting “the United

Additional DOE IG reports during 2019

States economy from severe petroleum

and 2020 revealed further deficiencies in

supply interruptions through the acquisition,

SPR program administration. A November

storage, distribution, and management of

26, 2019 report determined sample FLUOR

energy petroleum stocks.” He went on to

(Federal Petroleum Operations), which is

highlight how the attack in Saudi Arabia

responsible for managing and operating

highlights the vulnerability of global

SPR, subcontract files were not fully and

energy resources and how essential it is

consistently maintained and that invoice

to increase energy supply chain resiliency

approval was insufficiently based on

while also stressing the 645 million barrels

documentation to validate satisfactory

of oil and similar stockpiles in the U.S. and

subcontract

other nations are disincentives to those

maintained FLOUR subcontracts included

seeking to disrupt world oil supply and

the Contractor Purchasing System requiring

moderates prices for diesel, gasoline, and

contractors to employ fully documented

jet fuel to keep them from rising higher

and

than they would otherwise in such supply

systems

disruptions.

subcontract awards. DOE IG also found that

66

performance.

consistently
and

Deficiently

applied

methods

purchasing

and

including

Witness Jason E. Bordoff of Columbia

FLUOR’s invoice approval process failed to

University’s Center on Global Energy

demonstrate that payments were made for

Policy stressed that the U.S. is not energy

contracted goods and services and that

independent despite the shale revolution,

purchasing methods and documentation

stressed that oil demand will persist for

failed to establish transactional propriety

a long time with a potential transition

and prices paid. Report recommendations

process

SPR’s

included FLUOR updating its guidance for

importance, and that SPR modernization

all subcontract types requiring amounts

needs to be expedited. IEA Agency official

and types of subcontract file documents,

Kuiseke Sadeno noted that oil remains

supporting

the dominant fuel for the transport sector

approval, and expanding training efforts

with the petrochemical sector also leading

for staff involved in the invoice approval

demand growth. He also observed that the

process including fixed price subcontracts,

from

oil

increasing

documentation

for

invoice
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ensuring costs are adequately supported,

SPR and DOE had not considered the reserve’s

and subcontractor performance is properly

optimum size but that this was not included in

verified.

the 2016 Long-Term Strategic Review of the U.S.

68

A June 2020 DOE IG report documented
SPR modernization efforts.

Strategic Petroleum Review with an optimum

This document

size appraisal still not being identified as of

noted that SPR modernization plans address

August 2019. DOE IG reiterated its insistence

congressional concerns about the reserve’s age

that SPR identify its optimal configuration for

and condition, but may not ensure a modernized

present and future U.S. needs and that the Life

SPR infrastructure can meet drawdown and

Extension Phase II Project matches up with

distribution needs of a changing domestic

optimum SPR configuration. In its response

and international petroleum market. DOE IG

to DOE IG, SPR maintained it would complete a

expressed concern about how the projected 25

study on optimum SPR size.70

year Life Extension Project would change as a

As of June 9, 2020, SPR was authorized to

result of storage capacity created by oil sales.

hold up to 1 billion barrels of petroleum products,

These sales could reduce SPR’s capacity from

its physical storage capacity was 714 million

695 million barrels in 2015 to 400 million barrels

barrels, and its inventory was 635 million barrels

by the beginning of Fiscal Year 2029 which

as of April 17, 2020. Steep and rapid oil price

would represent the SPR’s lowest inventory and

declines in early 2020 prompted suspension of

more than 300 million barrels of unused storage

a sale to pay for SPR modernization with the

capacity.69

following chart illustrating declining spot prices

This report noted for many years that

between February and April 2020.

FIGURE 11 MARS CRUDE OIL SPOT PRICES AND SELECTED EVENTS 2020 71
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On April 2, 2020, DOE announced it

Transfer Terminal in Nederland, TX; and the

would make SPR storage capacity available

DOE-owned St. James Terminal in St. James,

to U.S. oil producers to reduce commercial

LA. 73

storage constraints.

Contractors would

2020 15 million barrels of exchanged oil had

BIDEN ADMINISTRATION
DEVELOPMENTS INJURING THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

been injected into SPR. 72

A key development occurring during the

have to make logistical arrangements to
deliver oil to and from SPR and as of June 5,

SPR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
SPR’s

distribution

and

ongoing

withdrawals

impacting

are

domestic oil production and ultimately SPR.

connected to distribution assets within

An early indication of such withdrawals

three

Seaway,

was Executive Order (EO) 14008 concerning

Texoma, and Capline. Seaway includes the

climate matters. This document cancelled

Bryan Mound site and connects to refinery

the Keystone XL pipeline which was rejected

hubs in Houston, Texas City, and Freeport,

by President Obama in 2015 and restored by

TX. Texoma includes the Big Hill and West

President Trump in 2017. Section 208 of this

Hackberry sites which are connected

document directed the Interior Department

to Beaumont-Port Arthur, Lake Charles,

to “pause new oil and natural gas leases on

and New Orleans area refineries. Capline

public lands or in offshore waters pending

includes Bayou Choctaw and connects to

completion of a comprehensive review

Baton Rouge Area refineries and one New

and Federal oil and gas permitting and

Orleans area refinery. As of August 2020,

leasing practices” to focus on potential

these storage sites, SPR owned pipelines

climate impacts in consultation with

and commercially owned pipelines and

multiple additional departments including

terminals were connected to 28 Gulf Coast

Agriculture, Commerce, and Energy. Section

area refineries and 6 refineries in Michigan,

209 of this order also directed departments

Ohio, and Kentucky.

to not directly subsidize fossil fuels.

distribution

systems

Biden Administration has been significant

systems:

A

SPR also connects to three marine

companion federal agency directive was

terminals with a combined contracted

Interior Department Order 3395 suspending

marine distribution capacity of 2.220

issuing offshore and onshore fossil fuel

MMbbl/d and also owns one marine

authorizations for new drilling on public

terminal (leased to Exxon Mobile Pipeline

lands. 74

Company whose distribution capacity is

On February 26, 2021, the Biden

400 Mbbl/d. These marine terminals are

Administration advocated updating the

Seaway Terminal (Enterprise Products) in

“social cost of greenhouse gas emissions”

Freeport, TX; Seaway Terminal (Enterprise

which

Products) in Texas City, TX; Texas Energy

greenhouse gas emissions on climate

could

increase

the

“cost”

of
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change to $51 per ton of carbon dioxide

reflect increasing crude oil and gasoline

which is seven times higher than the Trump

prices reflecting supply tightness due

Administration rate.75

to increasing demand recovery from the

Later that year,

this administration proposed eliminating

COVID-19 pandemic. 79

gas, oil, coal tax benefits for producers

In March 2022, Senator Michael

in favor of electric vehicles and “low-

Bennett (D-CO) and other Senate Democrats

carbon” alternatives including repealing

threaten to punish oil companies with a

the pass-through from corporate income

windfall profits tax if they increase energy

tax for partnerships receiving at least 90%

production. This proposal would require

of gross income from natural resources,

companies producing or importing at least

use of percentage depletion from oil and

300,000 barrels per day (or did so in 2019)

gas wells, and expensing exploration and

to pay a per-barrel tax equal to 50% of the

development costs.

difference between the current and average

76

August 11, 2021 saw Biden call on

price between 2015-2019 or about $57 per

OPEC producers to increase supply to curb

barrel. On March 21, 2022 the Securities

increasing oil prices even though the U.S. is

and

one of the world’s three largest producers

proposed rule which would overhaul how

and can deliver this oil with a lower carbon

publicly traded companies reveal detailed

footprint than most unregulated OPEC

information risk and mitigation strategies

national oil companies. Such administration

including listing their greenhouse gas

rhetoric will occur repeatedly after Russia’s

emissions associated with their customers

February 24, 2022 invasion of Ukraine.77 On

and suppliers. Such a move is ultimately

October 29, 2021, Biden and congressional

intended to divert investment from fossil

Democrats include a “methane fee” in

fuel producers. 80

proposed budget legislation which begin

Further

Exchange

Commission

documentation

issued

of

a

Biden

at $900 per ton in 2023 and increase to

Administration’s hostility to oil and gas

$1,500 in 2025. This fee structure would

drilling is reflected by its policies toward

essentially tax natural gas production

drilling on federal owned lands and waters.

and be counterproductive to U.S. energy

A September 6, 2022 Wall Street journal

security and economic growth. 78

report noted that this administration had

Biden sent a letter to Federal Trade

leased fewer acres for offshore oil and

Commission Chair Lina Khan on November

gas drilling and on federal lands than any

17, 2021 advocating an investigation into

administration since the end of World

oil and gas companies and retail gasoline

War II. Between January 20, 2021-August

prices. This ignores the reality that these

20, 2022 the Interior Department leased

prices are set in a global commodity

126,228 acres for drilling with the Nixon

marketplace, follow market trends in

Administration leasing out 4.4 million acres

crude and refined product prices, and

at this stage of its first term and the Truman
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Administration leasing out 65,658 acres

oil declined from 649,000 barrels per day in

in 1945-1946 during a time when off-shore

January 2021 to 360,000 barrels per day in

drilling was in its infancy and the federal

April 2022 when they were eliminated with

government didn’t control deep water

respective totals of U.S. imports from Russia,

leases characterizing today’s federal oil

in comparison with imports from non-OPEC

and gas program. The fracking shale boom

countries being 8.87% (7,316,000) in January

saw such leases decline during the Trump

2021 and 5.14% (7,002,000) in April 2022. In

Administration. The Biden Administration

addition, the Biden Administration has seen

was forced to resume onshore leasing

U.S. petroleum imports rise from 11,035

following a June 2021 ruling by a Louisiana

barrels per day in January 2021 to 26,213

federal judge that Biden’s 2021 moratorium

barrels per day in August 2022 representing

on this drilling was unlawful. Federal leases

an import-export deficit of 41,526 barrels

account for more than a quarter of U.S. oil

per day in 2021 and an import-export deficit

production with this production counting

of 27,355 barrels per day through August

for a record high in 2021. On April 15, 2022,

2022. 83

the Administration announced it would

These SPR withdrawals began in

resume the onshore leasing program but

October 2021 when SPR’s stocks were

charge oil drillers a higher royalty rate. 81

approximately 618 million barrels.

BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SPR
WITHDRAWALS

The

releases were planned using existing
SPR legal authorities for withdrawals
including mandatory sales, exchanges, and

The Biden Administration has been

emergency sales such as Russian military

characterized by significant drawdowns of

operations in Ukraine. It should be noted

SPR. This has been influenced by numerous

that large emergency sales may raise

factors including drastically volatile crude

concerns about SPR stock sufficiency and oil

oil and retail gasoline prices during his

stocks to address future supply disruptions.

administration. Composite crude oil prices

There is no legal minimum for SPR

rose from $51.39 per barrel in January 2021

stockholding requirements though there is

to $95.15 per barrel in August 2020. Regular

a recommended minimum storage guidance

unleaded gasoline prices went from $2.32

of 252.4 million barrels as of April 2022, but

per gallon in January 2021 to $3.88 per

limited drawdown authority depends on

gallon in September 2022.82 One rationale

stock levels and International Energy Policy

the Biden Administration has sought to use

authority signatories, including the U.S.,

to justify its SPR withdrawals has been

are required to hold reserves of up to 90

the February 24, 2022 Russian invasion

days petroleum imports during the previous

of Ukraine and Russia’s role as a major

calendar year. 84

international petroleum and natural gas
supplier. However, U.S. imports of Russian
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The following chart illustrates the crude oil and petroleum stocks and barrels from
2007-July 2022.
FIGURE 12 U.S. ENDING STOCKS SPR OF CURDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

During the Biden Administration, the SPR has been reduced from 638,095 barrels to
468,006 barrels as of July 2022, representing a 26.65% decline. 85

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES
Congressional

responses

to

these

House Oversight and Reform Committee

SPR’s sales have been varied with those from

Republicans have been particularly vocal in

congressional Republicans being particularly

expressing displeasure with Biden Administration

hostile. An October 19, 2022 assessment by House

SPR policy to Secretary of Energy Jennifer

Energy & Commerce Committee Republicans

Granholm during 2022. On May 26, 2022 14

was particularly scathing contending that Biden

committee Republicans sent a letter to Granholm

had sold more SPR reserves than all previous

how DOE’s proposed time frame to buy back 180

U.S. presidents, announced on this day that

million previously released emergency barrels

the administration was draining an additional

would be purchased with lower prices, contended

15 million barrels to support congressional

that DOE should work to produce more domestic

Democrats, and that he should work with

energy and requested a briefing on this subject,

congressional Republicans to enhance U.S.

and maintained that the IEA was not consulted in

energy security including requiring a plan to

advance about the Biden Administration’s March

increase production on federal lands if the

2022 decision to release 180 million barrels.87

President taps into the SPR for non-emergency

Committee Republicans concerns were

reasons. Additional areas of Republican energy

further expressed in a July 20, 2022 missive to

policy support include restarting the Keystone

Granholm signed by 20 members. This document

XL Pipeline, insisted on answers from DOE as to

expressed displeasure with a recent SPR sale

why emergency energy reserves were being sold

transferring 900,000 barrels of oil to Unipec

to China, and to quit encouraging OPEC to pump

America, which is a subsidiary of the Chinese

more oil.86

Communist Party owned Sinopec, and a recipient
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of billions of investment dollars by one of Hunter

ban; and documentation from January 20,

Biden’s equity funds BHR Partners. This sale to

2021-present between the White House and DOE

Unipec involved nearly $100 million and Oversight

concerning SPR releases and a potential export

and Reform Committee Republicans expressed

ban.89

their discontent that DOE had not provided the

Multiple reactions have been made on the

May 26 briefing they requested on the SPR by July

House and Senate floors to Biden Administration

27 and documents related to the Unipec sale and

SPR releases by members of both parties. On May

to Hunter Biden and/or BHR Partners.88

17, 2022 Senate Armed Services Committee Chair

An additional epistle from 13 Committee

Jack Reed (D-RI) noted he completely supported

Republicans to Granholm was sent on October

the President’s pledge to release a million barrels

26, 2022. This document expressed concern that

of oil per day from the SPR to stabilize oil prices

the Biden Administration soon may impose an oil

and claimed the retail pump price would be even

and gas export ban which could result in higher

higher if the President did not take this action.90

gas prices, supply chain problems, international

Reed was also joined by Representative David

market upheaval and reduced energy security

Cicilline (D-RI) in blaming higher petroleum

for the U.S. and its allies. This letter stressed

prices on purportedly greedy and manipulative

the October 5, 2022 decision by the Organization

petroleum companies seeking to take advantage

of Petroleum Exporting Countries and its

of the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to

affiliates to cut oil production by 2% beginning

raise prices.91

in November while also expressing concern that

On May 19, 2022, Representative Fred Keller

this decision would already worsen European

(R-PA) observed that SPR is supposed to be for

access to American fuel in light of Russia’s

natural disasters and emergencies but not for

military aggression in Ukraine would further

cleaning up Biden Administration policy failures.

worsen European and U.S. energy security. It also

He also contended that these withdrawals had

maintained that SPR only holds enough reserves

produced record high gas prices, the lowest

to offset U.S. consumption for 50 days if imports

levels of crude oil stockpiled in 3r years, and that

cease. Consequently, this document requested

Americans annual spending on gas had increased

DOE provide documents and communications

from $2,800-$5,000.92

from November 1 to present concerning DOE

Representative

Doug

Amalfa

(R-CA)

discussions of SPR releases in conjunction with

asserted on July 12, 2022 that the Biden

export bans including assessments of domestic

Administration was actively shipping SPR oil from

refinery capabilities if an export ban is enforced;

foreign countries to China, that he had shut down

documentation from September 1, 2022-present

the U.S. energy including exploration, pipelines,

referring to using the SPR to lower prices until

exploration permits and leases resulting in more

November 2022; documentation from January 20,

expensive fuel for supply chain sectors varying

2021-present between external third party groups

from farmers, manufacturers, and individuals

outside the government and DOE employees

taking children to school and going to stores.

concerning SPR releases and a potential export

Legislation to prohibit selling SPR assets to China
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was rejected by the House 219-206 on July 20,
2022.93
Similar legislation prohibiting SPR sales to
China was introduced in the Senate on August 6,
2022 by Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX). Senator John
Barasso (R-WY) introduced S. 4651 on July 17,
2022 requiring that SPR products not be exported
to certain countries and to state-owned entities
to countries of religious freedom concern, and
Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA)
and other prominent Republicans introduced H.R.
8488 on July 26, 2022 prohibiting SPR exports to
China.94
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CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Press sample of 598 adults revealed 61% of these

On October 19, 2022 the White House

decisions. An March 18-21, 2022 Ipsos/NPR poll

individuals considered energy very important

announced it would release 15 million barrels
from the SPR for delivery in December while
also notifying DOE to prepare for additional oil
releases this winter if needed. This announcement
also revealed the Administration’s desire to
repurchase oil from SPR when prices are $70 per
barrel. In addition, the White House also claimed
that gas prices had fallen $1.16 per gallon since
June.95 Unfortunately, this fails to account for
retail gasoline prices rising from $2.39 per gallon
at the Biden Administration’s advent in January
2021 to $3.99 per gallon through September 2022
representing a 66% increase. This is also part
of a larger economic environment which saw
consumer prices increase 8.2% in September
2022 for the last twelve months despite a 4.9%
decline in September gasoline prices due to
previous SPR withdrawals.

96

Energy subjects have become an important
factor in determining how individuals vote in the
2022 congressional elections. An October 10-

and 29% somewhat important in their voting
found a sample of 1,006 adults revealed 29%
strongly supported withdrawing SPR oil, 32%
somewhat supported such withdrawals, 10%
somewhat opposed, and 10% strongly opposed.
An additional March 18-21, 2022 Ipsos/NPR poll
of 1,006 adults revealed 30% strongly supported
more oil and gas development on federal lands;
23% somewhat supported such development;
13% somewhat opposed, 14% strongly opposed;
and 18% did not know.97
2021 and 2022 have been years which
have thunderously reinforced and emphasis the
critical economic and geopolitical importance
of petroleum and petroleum products and
how they contribute to our standard of living,
personal health, national security, and economic
advancement. The U.S. Department of Energy
notes that over 6,000 products are made
from oil and natural gas petrochemicals with
representative examples including:

16 Pew Research Center for the People and the
FIGURE 13 PRODUCTS MADE FROM OIL AND GAS 98
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ROOFING

SHOWER CURTAINS

SOLAR PANELS

TOOTHBRUSHES

TRASH BAGS
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The SPR is a critical domestic economic,

•

DOE must coordinate SPR holdings with

geopolitical, and national security asset which

private sector stocks when a supply disruption

must not be used for frivolous domestic political

occurs. DOE must also periodically evaluate

and economic price manipulation. It must be a

SPR due to constant changes in the crude oil

critical component of U.S. and global geostrategic

and petroleum markets and identify whether

statecraft and illustrates the ongoing and

additional regional petroleum product reserves

enduring importance of fossil fuels in U.S. and

should be part of the SPR.

international energy and strategic policy. U.S.

•

Congress should determine a flexible long-term

energy policy must not be allowed to fall victim

SPR target size. The chair and ranking member

to the illusory seduction of renewable energy as a

of the House Energy and Commerce Committee

long-term and affordable replacement to national

and Senate Energy and Natural Resources

economic and security strategy and personal

Committee must be consulted and approve

living standards. Numerous steps should be

all SPR withdrawals other than emergency

taken to enhance and strengthen SPR’s long term

situations.

viability. These include:

•

U.S. policymakers must recognize that the
SPR is a critical safety valve for accessing U.S.

•

•

Recognize that the SPR is directly linked to

energy resources as opposed to global transit

affordable American energy and should not be

chokepoints as varied as the Panama Canal,

used for short-term political expediency.

Malacca Strait, Bab El Mandeb-Strait, Suez

Increasing the maximum size of the SPR to

• Mediterranean (SUMED) and Strait of Hormuz

at least the 726,616 barrel peak of December

which would be attractive geopolitical targets

2009. This would do a better job of meeting

to close in an international conflict.

domestic energy needs and IEA requirements,

•

•

•

The Biden Administration should expand the

and give some flexibility in the event of a large

scope of its February 24, 2021 Executive Order

scale military conflict in regions such as East

14017 on supply chain security to strengthen

Asia.

the resilience of the U.S. oil industry.99

Amending legislation authorizing sales to
foreign countries by prohibiting such sales

The U.S. diesel fuel market is also related to

to countries such as China, Iran, North

the SPR in terms of its impact on U.S. consumer

Korea, Russia, & Venezuela which are hostile

prices and the supply chain. Most freight and

geopolitically and serial violators of human

delivery trucks, along with trains, buses, boats,

rights.

farm, construction, military vehicles, and some

Resume the Keystone Pipeline and increase

light cars and trucks have diesel engines. Such

drilling on lands held by the Bureau of Land

fuel is also used for electricity generating

Management and offshore lands administered

generators and other global locations including

by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.

industrial facilities, large buildings, institutional

These assets should be first allocated to the

facilities, hospitals, and electricity utilities which

SPR.

use diesel generators for backup and electricity
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power supplies. Transporting supplies to numerous retail outlets also occurs by diesel fuel powered
vehicles.100
Diesel fuel prices are higher than gasoline prices as this Energy Information Administration chart
demonstrates and contributes to increasing consumer product costs as this chart demonstrates for
various U.S. geographic regions.
FIGURE 14 U.S. ON-HIGHWAY DIESEL FUEL PRICES*(DOLLARS PER GALLON)

There is evidence that the U.S.

average. This will also impact home heating

is currently experiencing a diesel fuel

oil costs in the eastern and northern U.S. 101

shortage to further exacerbate its high

The NEHOR must also be considered

petroleum prices. EIA has reported that

a vital component of domestic economic

distillate inventories (diesel, heating oil,

well-being and national security.

and jet fuel) are at their lowest levels

there is some growth in renewable energy

since 2008. These low inventories are why

sources, fossil fuel resources are still by

diesel fuel is priced at over $5 per gallon

far the key factors in American economic

as opposed to the $4 per gallon of gasoline.

activity,

Diesel prices are high because refineries do

security. Countries such as the U.S. and its

maintenance this time of year with refinery

allies must engage in cooperative resource

capacity consequently falling. In addition,

nationalism to ensure that they and their

refinery capacity is falling due to closures

allies have sufficient energy resources

of unprofitable refineries and the loss of

to meet domestic economic and national

Russian imports. An October 22 EIA Winter

security needs. The dangerous dependence

Fuels Outlook projection forecast that east

of the U.S. and its allies on unreliable and

coast diesel fuel stocks would be 25.5

unstable foreign partners such as Saudi

million barrels or 45% below the five year

Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela for its energy

transportation,

and

While

national
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and strategic minerals supplies must end
and a new spirit of optimal energy and
national defense self-sufficiency must
assume precedence in their policymaking.
This dangerous dependence on hostile
foreign energy suppliers is also reflected by
the Nord Stream pipeline which has made
many European countries dangerously
dependent on Russian natural gas. Failing
to achieve optimal energy independence
leaves the U.S. and its allies at the mercy
of hostile geopolitical actors and is likely to
produce grievous domestic economic and
social consequences. 102
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